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FREE SPEECH, PUBLIC SAFETY,                                              
& CONTROVERSIAL SPEAKERS:                         
BALANCING UNIVERSITIES’ DUAL ROLES 
AFTER CHARLOTTESVILLE 
ELISABETH E. CONSTANTINO† 
INTRODUCTION 
On a humid night in August, 2017, self-proclaimed members 
of the alt-right gathered in Emancipation Park in Charlottesville, 
Virginia.1  Invoking Nazi imagery through clothing and chants, 
protestors entered the University of Virginia campus.2  Wielding 
weapons, marchers pelted protestors “with water bottles, 
chemicals, tear gas, rocks,”3 and hurled racist epithets and 
threats of violence.4  The protests continued into the next day.5  
On August 12, the city declared a state of emergency.6  On the 
same day, a man driving a Dodge Challenger plowed into a group 
 
† J.D. Candidate, 2019, St. John’s University School of Law. 
1 Sarah Toy & Charles Ventura, Federal Judge Allows ‘Alt-Right’ Rally to Go 
Ahead as Planned, USA TODAY, Aug. 11, 2017; Clara Turnage & Andy Thomason, As 
White Supremacists Wreak Havoc, a University Becomes a Crisis Center, CHRON. OF 
HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 12, 2017), https://www.chronicle.com/article/As-White-Suprem 
acists-Wreak/240912. 
2 See What U.Va. Students Saw in Charlottesville, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/13/opinion/university-virginia-uva-protests-
charlottesville.html [hereinafter What U.Va. Students Saw] (statement of Weston 
Gobar); see Meg Wagner, ‘Blood and Soil’: Protesters Chant Nazi Slogan in 
Charlottesville, CNN (Aug. 12, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/12/us/charlottes 
ville-unite-the-right-rally/index.html. 
3 What U.Va. Students Saw, supra note 2 (statement of Weston Gobar); Laurel 
Wamsley, Charlottesville Violence Highlights Cities’ Struggle to Balance Rights and 
Safety, NPR (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/08/14/ 
543462419/charlottesville-violence-highlights-cities-struggle-to-balance-rights-and-
safety. 
4 What U.Va. Students Saw, supra note 2 (statement of Aryn A. Frazier) 
(describing how one protestor “told a white woman, who was holding a sign 
promoting peace, that she was a race traitor, and despite her wide hips, he’d be 
willing to show her what a real man was all about.”); id. (statement of Isabella 
Ciambotti) (describing how she was repeatedly told “I hope you get raped by a [n-
word].”). 
5 Lisa Marie Segarra, Violent Clashes Turn Deadly in Charlottesville During 
White Nationalist Rally, TIME (Aug. 12, 2017, 6:56 PM), http://time.com/4898118/ 
state-of-emergency-declared-as-violent-clashes-in-charlottesville-continue/. 
6 Id. 
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of peaceful counter-protestors, maiming numerous people and 
killing one woman, Heather Heyer.7  To counter-protestors, the 
purpose of the event was clear: intimidation.8 
One year earlier, DePaul University hosted an interview on 
its campus with right-wing political commentator Milo 
Yiannopoulos.9  As soon as the interview began, student 
protestors stormed the stage and chanted over Yiannopoulos, 
renouncing his views.10  One student stood onstage and blew a 
high-pitched whistle into a microphone, drowning out any further 
comments by Yiannopoulos.11  The audience pleaded with the 
protestors, but the protestors refused to leave the stage.12 
In response to events such as these, students have renounced 
hate speech and called on universities to silence intolerant and 
offensive views.13  Universities have struggled to balance public 
safety with a commitment to free speech and state legislatures 
have enacted policies limiting universities’ ability to silence 
controversial speech on campus.14  Although these policies show 
an important commitment to free speech, their provisions often 
fail to strike a reasonable balance between universities’ dual 
obligations to both protect free expression and keep their 
students safe. 
This Note seeks to develop an approach to hateful and 
controversial speech that protects First Amendment values and 
students alike.  Part I discusses the legal backdrop and First 
Amendment tradition that underlies a permissive view of hateful 
 
7 Kaylee Hartung & Darran Simon, Charge Upgraded Against Suspect in 
Charlottesville Rally Killing, CNN (Dec. 15, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.cnn.com/ 
2017/12/14/us/charlottesville-james-alex-fields-court-appearance/index.html. 
8 What U.Va. Students Saw, supra note 2 (statements of Weston Gobar and 
Brendan Novak). 
9 Andy Thomason, DePaul President Condemns Protesters Who Shouted Down 
Controversial Speaker, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (May 25, 2016), https://chron 
icle.com/blogs/ticker/depaul-president-condemns-protestors-who-shouted-down-
controversial-speaker/111605. 
10 Rob Gray, Black Lives Matter Protesters Disrupt Milo Yiannopoulos Speech at 
DePaul University, YOUTUBE (May 24, 2016), https://youtu.be/IawEMxTroBk. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 See Abigail Hauslohner & Susan Svrluga, Free Speech or Hate Speech? 
Campus Debates Over Victimhood Put Universities in a Bind, WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/free-speech-or-hate-speech-campus 
-debates-over-victimhood-put-university-officials-in-a-bind/2017/10/20/7…/?nore 
direct=on. 
14 Beth McMurtrie, One University Asks: How Do You Promote Free Speech 
Without Alienating Students?, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., (Oct. 23, 2016); see infra 
Part II.B. 
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speech on university campuses.  Part I also discusses the roots of 
time, place, and manner regulations and the public forum 
doctrine, both of which recent legislation invokes.  Part II 
provides a timeline of events that have highlighted the tension 
between free speech and public safety on campuses.  Part II also 
discusses the eruption of legislation that these events inspired.  
Finally, Part III recommends provisions that bills of this type can 
include, as well as provisions that these bills should avoid.  Part 
III proposes a more effective form that recent legislation can 
take, which better balances universities’ dual roles. 
I. BACKGROUND AND LEGAL FOUNDATION 
A. Hateful Speech as Protected Speech 
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”15  Although this 
protection is not absolute, it extends to hate speech.16  Absent a 
compelling governmental interest to curtail it, state actors 
cannot restrict hate speech.17  This policy reflects our First 
Amendment tradition, which protects even the most offensive 
speech, notwithstanding the speech’s capacity to offend.18 
1. The Bedrock of Hate Speech Protection: R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul provides a framework for 
evaluating impermissible regulations of hateful speech.  In 
R.A.V., the Supreme Court analyzed the validity of a Minnesota 
hate speech ordinance.19  The ordinance made illegal placing hate 
symbols such as burning crosses and swastikas on either private 
or public property.20  The Court recognized that the ordinance 
only reached expressions that fell under the category of “fighting 
 
15 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
16 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382–83, 391 (1992). 
17 Id. at 395–96. 
18 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle 
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the 
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or 
disagreeable.”). 
19 See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380–81. 
20 Id. at 380. 
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words,” an unprotected category of speech.21  Still, the Court 
struck down the ordinance, holding that it impermissibly limited 
speech based on viewpoint.22  The Court clarified that viewpoint 
discrimination, even within a generally unprotected category of 
speech, is impermissible.23 
The Court then distinguished two distinct types of 
unprotected speech: (1) speech that falls within narrow 
categories of unprotected expression, that state actors cannot 
selectively restrict based on viewpoint, and (2) speech whose 
utterance violates a further constitutional protection, which state 
actors may restrict based on viewpoint. 
Under the first type, the Court explained that it has adopted 
a “limited categorical approach” to areas of unprotected speech.24  
The Supreme Court articulated the standard for these narrow 
categories, holding that areas of unprotected speech are “no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight 
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be 
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in 
order and morality.”25  These categories include fighting words,26 
inciting speech,27 and true threats.28  The Court in R.A.V. added 
to this standard, holding that the unprotected features of some 
speech do not relate to their content, but rather their 
“nonspeech” qualities.29  The “nonspeech” qualities of this 
expressive behavior remove it from the realm of First 
Amendment protection.30  Still, within this unprotected category, 
state actors cannot restrict one viewpoint; therefore, the 
Minnesota ordinance was unconstitutional.31 
The second type of speech encompasses rare instances where 
unprotected speech may be prohibited based on viewpoint.  The 
Court gave the example of sexual harassment.32  States may 
 
21 Id. at 380–81. “[F]ighting words” are words “which by their very utterance 
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
22 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391. 
23 See id. at 383–84. 
24 Id. at 383–88. 
25 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72. 
26 Id. 
27 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1968) (per curiam). 
28 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam). 
29 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 386. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 391. 
32 Id. at 389–90. 
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permissibly proscribe sexual harassment in the workplace, 
because, although sexual harassment often involves speech, it 
violates Title VII’s prohibition on workplace sex discrimination.33  
The Court emphasized the narrow scope of this exclusion, but 
concluded that states may limit some expressive behavior that 
violates other constitutional protections. 
In the wake of R.A.V., universities have attempted to adopt 
codes targeting hateful, valueless speech, but these attempts 
have been unavailing.34  “Over 300 colleges and universities 
adopted hate speech codes in the early 1990s.  Every one to be 
challenged in court was ruled unconstitutional.”35 
2. Pulling Back on the Protection of Hateful Speech: Virginia v. 
Black 
Eleven years later, in Virginia v. Black, the Supreme Court 
limited the scope of the protection of hateful speech.36  In Black, 
the Supreme Court concluded that the state of Virginia could 
permissibly ban cross burning with an intent to intimidate.37  In 
reaching its decision, the Court drew heavily on cross burning’s 
“long and pernicious history as a signal of impending violence.”38  
The Court held that “[i]ntimidation in the constitutionally 
proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a 
speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the 
intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.”39 
 
 
 
 
33 Id. 
34 David L. Hudson Jr. & Lata Nott, Hate Speech & Campus Speech Codes, 
FREEDOM F. INST., https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/first-amendment-center/ 
topics/freedom-of-speech-2/free-speech-on-public-college-campuses-overview/hate-
speech-campus-speech-codes/ (last updated Mar. 2017). 
35 Opinion, The Free Speech-Hate Speech Trade-Off, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/opinion/berkeley-dean-erwin-chemerinsky.html 
(statement of Erwin Chemerinsky). 
36 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 363 (2003) (plurality opinion); Alexander 
Tsesis, Burning Crosses on Campus: University Hate Speech Codes, 43 CONN. L. 
REV. 617, 620 (2010) (explaining that in Black, the Supreme Court “defined the 
scope of legitimate limitations on destructive messages.”). 
37 Black, 538 U.S. at 363. 
38 Id. at 352–57, 363. 
39 Id. at 360. 
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The Court held that Black’s prohibition did not constitute 
viewpoint discrimination of unprotected speech, as in R.A.V.40  
Although the opinion in Black defined an outer limit to R.A.V.’s 
protection, because of its limited scope, the opinion has not 
subverted the traditional view that hateful speech is protected. 
B. Hateful Speech on Campus: Additional Areas of First 
Amendment Protection 
1. The Heckler’s Veto 
Under the doctrine of the “heckler’s veto,” state actors cannot 
justify silencing speakers for fear of violent dissent.  A “heckler’s 
veto” is “the suppression of speech by the government . . . because 
of the possibility of a violent reaction by hecklers.”41  In Berger v. 
Battaglia, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit recognized that a significant threat to free speech is 
“successful importuning of government to curtail ‘offensive’ 
speech at peril of suffering disruptions of public order.”42  
Universities silencing speakers on campuses due to threats of 
violence by a speaker’s opponents violates this policy.43 
The issue becomes more complicated when the threat of 
violence originates from proponents of the speaker, rather than 
the opponents.  In Charlottesville, the act of violence was 
perpetrated by a supporter of the white supremacist rally against 
counter-protestors.44  Such a situation does not fit the traditional 
definition of the heckler’s veto, but still results in silencing a 
speaker due to risk of a violent response.  Although in such a 
situation, administrators are not necessarily favoring one 
viewpoint over another—only the speaker’s viewpoint is silenced. 
 
40 Id. at 362. 
41 Brett G. Johnson, The Heckler’s Veto: Using First Amendment Theory and 
Jurisprudence to Understand Current Audience Reactions Against Controversial 
Speech, 21 COMM. L. & POL’Y 175, 180 (2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Ronald 
B. Standler, Heckler’s Veto, (last updated Dec. 4, 1999)). 
42 Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 1001 (4th Cir. 1985). 
43 See id. 
44 Jonah Engel Bromwich & Alan Blinder, What We Know About James Alex 
Fields, Driver Charged in Charlottesville Killing, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/13/us/james-alex-fields-charlottesville-driver-
.html. 
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2. Political Speech in Schools and Universities 
Importantly, not all of the controversial speech on campuses 
fits within traditional notions of hate speech.  Many of the 
controversial speakers who have sought to speak on university 
campuses simply espouse controversial political views.45  These 
campus speakers enjoy increased protection because their 
messages are often political in nature.  Because protections of 
political speech are at the core of First Amendment tradition, 
political speech is afforded not only most exacting scrutiny,46 but 
also particular reverence.47 
In Tinker v. Des Moines, the Supreme Court upheld students’ 
rights to engage in non-disruptive political expression in high 
schools.48  Although elementary and high school administrators 
may permissibly control messages that disrupt the school’s 
functioning, public university administrators do not have the 
same discretion.49  Universities may not proscribe political speech 
due to its disruptive nature. 
 
 
 
45 Take, for example Ann Coulter, who was disinvited from a speaking event at 
U.C. Berkeley because of her Republican views. See Eliott C. McLaughlin, Ann 
Coulter Controversy Tests Berkeley’s Free Speech Credentials, CNN (Apr. 27, 2017, 
8:46 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/27/us/berkeley-ann-coulter-free-speech/ 
index.html. Compare merely unpopular speakers such as Coulter to speakers such 
as Richard Spencer, whose outwardly racist speech more closely fits notions of hate 
speech. Callum Borchers, Is Richard Spencer a White Nationalist or a White 
Supremacist? It Depends on the News Source., WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/10/19/is-richard-spencer-a-
white-nationalist-or-a-white-supremacist-it-depends-on-the-news-source/?noredir 
ect=on&utm_term=.9facd9c90e9e. 
46 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007). 
47 See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 329 
(2010) (recognizing that political speech is “central to the meaning and purpose of 
the First Amendment”). 
48 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969). 
49 See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986) (recognizing 
a high school’s ability to impose disciplinary sanctions for conduct “disruptive of the 
educational process”); 2 RODNEY A. SMOLLA & MELVILLE NIMMER, SMOLLA & 
NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 17:2.50 (Clark Boardman Callaghan ed., 3d ed. 
1996) (noting that the Third Circuit has held that “university officials have less 
discretion to limit the speech of college students than elementary and high school 
officials have to limit the speech of students in those lower grades.”). 
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3. Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions, and the Public Forum 
Doctrine 
Even protected expression may be subject to some 
limitations.  Specifically, state actors may impose “reasonable 
time, place, or manner restrictions.”50  In Clark v. Community for 
Creative Non-Violence, the Supreme Court upheld a time, place, 
or manner restriction prohibiting camping in public parks.51  The 
regulation was valid even though it interfered with a planned 
protest because the regulation was a content-neutral “reasonable 
time, place or manner” restriction.52 
Time, place, and manner regulations are valid in public fora, 
but are subject to heightened scrutiny.  A “public forum,” is a 
location traditionally considered to be a hub of free speech, 
including public parks or sidewalks.53  Speech in public fora 
receives additional First Amendment protection.54  Public fora 
can either be deemed traditional, such as public parks or 
sidewalks, or limited—a location that the state has opened to the 
public for a communicative purpose.55  Speech restrictions in 
either type of public forum are subject to heightened scrutiny. 
In a traditional public forum, content-based speech 
regulations are afforded strict scrutiny: to impose a content-
based restriction on a traditional public forum, the government 
must show that “regulation is necessary to serve a compelling 
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that 
end.”56  In a traditional public forum, the government may 
impose time, place, and manner restrictions, but those 
restrictions must be content-neutral, “narrowly tailored to serve 
a significant government interest, and leave open ample 
alternative channels of communication.”57  Designated public fora 
are afforded the same constitutional protections as traditional 
public fora.  The difference between designated and traditional 
 
50 Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). 
51 Id. at 289. 
52 Id. at 297–98. 
53 1 SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 49, at § 8:3. 
54 See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) 
(“In places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to 
assembly and debate, the rights of the state to limit expressive activity are sharply 
circumscribed.”). 
55 Id. at 45–46. 
56 Id. at 45. 
57 Id. 
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public fora is that the state is not under an obligation to keep 
designated fora available to the public.58 
Public universities may designate spaces to be public fora,59 
and some courts have held that the outdoor space on a university 
campus is a designated public forum whether or not the 
university has acted to designate it as such.60  Legislatures have 
sought to codify the latter approach and deem the open spaces on 
university campuses traditional public fora for purposes of First 
Amendment protection.61 
II. RECENT EVENTS: A TIMELINE 
This Part describes the recent events leading up to and 
following the increased adoption of university free speech policies 
by states, and discusses examples of this legislation.  This Part 
discusses the issues that states have sought to address, as well 
as the problems the legislation may have created. 
A. Rising Tensions: 2016–Spring, 2017 
The tension between free speech and campus safety is not 
new,62 but the debate has resurged in light of the rise of the “alt-
 
58 Id. at 45–46 (noting that limited public fora are “bound by the same 
standards as apply in a traditional public forum. Reasonable time, place and manner 
regulations are permissible, and a content-based prohibition must be narrowly 
drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest.”); see Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 
263, 267–68 (1981) (“The Constitution forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions 
from a forum generally open to the public, even if it was not required to create the 
forum in the first place.”). But see Warren v. Fairfax Cty., 196 F.3d 186, 193–94 (4th 
Cir. 1999) (applying a two-level approach to limited public fora, distinguishing an 
“internal standard,” providing strict scrutiny for attempts to exclude a speaker who 
falls within a group already permitted to speak, and an “external standard,” 
providing intermediate scrutiny when determining which classes of individuals may 
be allowed to speak in the limited public forum). 
59 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267–70 (holding that, because the University of Missouri 
at Kansas City generally made its facilities open to student groups, it thereby 
created a limited public forum, and discrimination based on religion in that context 
was impermissible). 
60 This application of public forum doctrine has been adopted by the circuit 
courts. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Mote, 423 F.3d 438, 444–45 (4th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that a university, by its very nature as an educational institution, is a 
limited public forum, and that regulation of speech therein need only be “viewpoint 
neutral and reasonable in light of the objective purposes served by the forum.”). 
61 See infra Part II.B.1. 
62 See Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist 
Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 434 (1990). 
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right” and their focus on university campuses.63  Far-right and 
white supremacist groups have taken particular aim at college 
campuses as locations to host rallies and recruit members.64  
When right-wing speakers hold events on campuses, they are 
often met with protests, which range from peaceful to 
uproarious.65  In May 2016, Milo Yiannopoulos was invited to 
speak at DePaul University.66  The speech drew protests, which 
culminated in protestors jumping onstage, chanting and blowing 
a whistle to make any further speech by Yiannopoulos 
inaudible.67  The event raised questions about the extent to which 
protestors should be permitted to disrupt speech, and whether 
universities can provide a platform for opposing views without 
alienating students.68  In September 2016, a similar disruption 
occurred at Georgetown University during a panel discussion of 
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s career.69 
In February 2017, the University of California (“U.C.”), 
Berkeley cancelled a scheduled speech by Yiannopoulos following 
violent protests and riots.70  In April 2017, U.C. Berkeley invited 
Ann Coulter to speak on campus, but subsequently cancelled her 
 
63 Goldie Blumenstyk, Nell Gluckman, & Eric Kelderman, When White 
Supremacists Descend, What Can a College President Do?, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. 
(Aug. 12, 2017), http://www.chronicle.com/article/When-White-Supremacists/240913. 
64 Lois Beckett, White Nationalists’ Latest Tactic to Recruit College Students: 
Paper Flyers and Tape, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 5, 2017), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2017/apr/05/white-nationalists-posters-college-student-recruitment; 
Blumenstyk, Gluckman, & Kelderman, supra note 63; Clayton J. Plake & Edna 
Bonhomme, Opposing Far-Right and Openly Fascist Groups on Campus, UNIV. 
WORLD NEWS (Sept. 15, 2017), http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?sto 
ry=20170912130021905; Susan Svrluga, ‘Unprecedented Effort’ by ‘White 
Supremacists’ to Recruit and Target College Students, Group Claims, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/03/06/un 
precedented-effort-by-white-supremacists-to-recruit-and-target-college-students-
group-claims/?utm_term=.a26923964946. 
65 Madison Park & Kyung Lah, Berkeley Protests of Yiannopoulos Caused 
$100,000 in Damage, CNN (Feb. 2, 2017, 8:33 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/01/ 
us/milo-yiannopoulos-berkeley/index.html. 
66 Thomason, supra note 9. Although a private university, and beyond the ambit 
of the state action doctrine, the event has become a symbol of students’ hostility to 
free speech rights. McMurtrie, supra note 14. 
67 Gray, supra note 10.  
68 McMurtrie, supra note 14. 
69 Cassidy Jensen & Ryan Miller, Netanyahu Panel Interrupted by Protest, THE 
GEO. VOICE (Sept. 11, 2016), https://georgetownvoice.com/2016/09/11/netanyahu-pan 
el-interrupted-by-protest/. 
70 Park & Lah, supra note 65. 
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event for fear of further violent protests.71  The events sparked 
criticism and a nationwide discussion of free speech on campus.72  
The Foundation for Individual Rights in Education has compiled 
a running list of speakers who have been disinvited from 
educational institutions.73  The list indicates that university 
speakers disinvited in 2016 and 2017 were cancelled largely, but 
not exclusively, due to leftists’ objections to speakers’ political 
views.74 
In April 2017, Cameron Padgett, Richard Spencer’s college 
tour organizer, rented out the Foy Arena at Auburn University 
for the prominent white nationalist to speak on campus.75  The 
university, due to concerns that Spencer’s presence would 
endanger public safety, attempted to cancel the event.76  Shortly 
thereafter, Padgett sought a temporary restraining order. 
A federal judge granted a preliminary injunction, reasoning 
that “[w]hile Mr. Spencer’s beliefs and message are controversial, 
Auburn presented no evidence that Mr. Spencer advocates 
violence.”77  The court held that because the university “did not 
produce evidence that Mr. Spencer’s speech . . . [was] likely to 
incite or produce imminent lawless action,” it was improper for 
the university to attempt to forbid the speaker from spreading 
 
71 Susan Svrluga, William Wan & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Ann Coulter Speech at 
UC Berkeley Canceled, Again, Amid Fears for Safety, WASH. POST (Apr. 26, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/04/26/ann-coulter-
speech-canceled-at-uc-berkeley-amid-fears-for-safety/?utm_term=.b5fbc6b27e8d. 
72 See, e.g., Susan Svrluga & Brian Murphy, Trump Lashes Back at Berkeley 
After Violent Protests Block Speech by Breitbart Writer Milo Yiannopoulos, WASH. 
POST (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/02/ 
01/berkeley-cancels-speech-by-breitbrart-writer-milo-amid-intense-
protests/?utm_term=.ba89d604198f; Stanley Kurtz, Year of the Shout-Down: It Was 
Worse Than You Think, NAT’L REVIEW (May 31, 2017, 9:48 AM), https://www.nat 
ionalreview.com/corner/year-shout-down-worse-you-think-campus-free-speech/. 
73 Disinvitation Attempts, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN EDUC. 
https://www.thefire.org/resources/disinvitation-database/ (last visited Sept. 10, 
2018). 
74 Id. 
75 Travis M. Andrews, Federal Judge Stops Auburn from Canceling White 
Nationalist Richard Spencer Speech. Protests and a Scuffle Greet Him., WASH. POST 
(Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/04/19/ 
federal-judge-stops-auburn-from-canceling-white-nationalists-speech-violence-
erupts/?utm_term=.f71bb08dc081; Lois Beckett, After Charlottesville, White 
Nationalist’s Campus Event Fuels Free Speech Debate, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 18, 
2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/oct/18/richard-spencer-university-
of-florida-event-free-speech-debate. 
76 Andrews, supra note 75. 
77 Padgett v. Auburn Univ., No. 3:17-CV-231-WKW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
74076, at *2 (M.D. Ala. 2017). 
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his message.78  The court reasoned that the school’s belief that 
“listeners and protest groups opposed to Mr. Spencer’s ideology 
would react to the content of his speech by engaging in protests 
that could cause violence or property damage” was not a 
sufficient legal justification.79  In accordance with the court order, 
Auburn University allowed Mr. Spencer to speak on campus.  
The event led to protests and skirmishes, but not deadly 
violence.80 
B. Reactive Legislation: Spring, 2017–Summer, 2017 
In the spring of 2017, states reacted to students’ hostility 
toward offensive views with an explosion of legislation seeking to 
protect free speech.81  In addition to reiterating prevailing First 
Amendment standards, these laws protect free speech rights in 
two ways: first, some took particular aim at free speech zones, 
and sought to ban them, sometimes invoking the public forum 
doctrine; next, others went further, seeking to punish students 
for interfering with the free speech rights of their fellow 
students. 
1. Bills That Seek to Ban “Free Speech Zones” 
Some universities regulate demonstrations by imposing “free 
speech zones.”  Free speech zone policies limit demonstrations 
and protests to particular areas of campuses, and can be valid 
time, place, or manner regulations.82  At the district court level, 
courts have upheld the use of content-neutral campus free speech 
zone and permit requirements, noting that those requirements 
did not extend to “those park areas, plazas, sidewalks, and 
streets of the campus that comprise the irreducible public forums 
 
78 Id. at *2–4 (“[A]dvocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where 
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is 
likely to incite or produce such action.”) (emphasis added) (quoting Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)). 
79 Id. at *3. 
80 David J. Philip, White Nationalist Richard Spencer’s Speech at Auburn 
Sparks Protests, Arrests, NPR (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2017/04/19/524683153/white-nationalist-richard-spencers-speech-at-auburn-
sparks-protests-arrests. 
81 Lauren Camera, Campus Free Speech Laws Ignite the Country, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REPORT (July 31, 2017, 5:40 P.M.), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-
states/articles/2017-07-31/campus-free-speech-laws-ignite-the-country. 
82 See Samantha Harris, ‘Free Speech Zones,’ Then and Now, FOUND. FOR 
INDIVIDUAL RTS. IN EDUC. (Dec. 27, 2016), https://www.thefire.org/free-speech-zones-
then-and-now/. 
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of the campus.”83  Nevertheless, some universities have chosen to 
eliminate free speech zone policies, either unilaterally or in 
response to legal backlash.84 
In March 2017, Utah enacted a law designating the outdoor 
areas of university campuses “traditional public for[a]”85  The bill 
also required that an institution only enforce restrictions on 
expressive activity if they “(a) are narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant institutional interest; (b) are based on published, 
content-neutral, and viewpoint-neutral criteria; and (c) leave 
open ample alternative channels for communication.”86 
In April 2017, the governor of Colorado signed into law a 
measure banning free speech zones.87  The law provides that 
time, place, and manner regulations may only be imposed if they 
“(a) Are reasonable; (b) Are justified without reference to the 
content of the speech; (c) Are narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant governmental interest; and (d) Leave open ample 
alternative channels for communication of the information or 
message.”88 
In May 2017, Tennessee abolished free speech zones,89 
requiring universities to “maintain the generally accessible, 
open, outdoor areas of its campus as traditional public forums for 
free speech by students.”90  In August 2017, the Florida 
legislature introduced a law banning free speech zones, 
empowering individuals to sue universities for violating their 
expressive rights.91  In March 2018, the bill was signed into law.92 
 
83 Roberts v. Haragan, 346 F. Supp. 2d 853, 866–68 (N.D. Tex. 2004). 
84 See Smith v. Tarrant Cty. Coll. Dist., 694 F. Supp. 2d 610, 624 (N.D. Tex. 
2010) (concluding that the issue of the constitutionality of a campus free speech zone 
policy had become moot in light of the university’s elimination of the policy); Andy 
Thomason, 2 Colleges Pay a Combined $160,000 to Settle Free-Speech Lawsuits, 
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 3, 2014), https://www.chronicle.com/blogs/ticker/u-of-
hawaii-pays-students-50000-as-part-of-settlement-of-free-speech-suit/90583. 
85 H.B. 54, 2017 Legis., Gen. Sess., 2017 Utah Laws 440. 
86 Id. 
87 Chris Quintana & Andy Thomason, The States Where Campus Free-Speech 
Bills Are Being Born: A Rundown, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (May 15, 2017), 
https://chronicle.com/article/The-States-Where-Campus/240073; COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 23-5-144(4) (West 2017) (“An institution of higher education shall not 
designate any area on campus as a free speech zone or otherwise create policies 
implying that its students’ expressive activities are restricted to particular areas of 
campus.”). 
88 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-5-144(5) (West 2017). 
89 TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-7-2405(a) (West 2018). 
90 Id. 
91 C.S./S.B. 4, 120th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2018). 
92 Id. 
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2. Bills that Seek to Ban Interference with Free Speech Rights 
of Other Students 
In February 2017, Illinois introduced a bill that would 
require the suspension or expulsion of students who infringe 
upon the free speech rights of others.93  The legislature is still 
considering that bill. 
In May 2017, California introduced a constitutional 
amendment involving campus free speech.94  The amendment 
would require universities to adopt “[a] range of disciplinary 
sanctions for anyone under the jurisdiction of the institution who 
interferes with the free expression of others.”95  That same 
month, Michigan introduced a bill requiring that “any student 
who has twice been found responsible for infringing upon the 
expressive rights of others . . . be suspended for a minimum of 1 
year or expelled.”96  Both bills are still under consideration. 
In July 2017, North Carolina passed a bill, the stated 
purpose of which was to restore and preserve campus free 
speech.97  The North Carolina bill requires universities to 
“implement a range of disciplinary sanctions for anyone under 
the jurisdiction of a constituent institution who . . . substantially 
interferes with the protected free expression rights of others, 
including protests and demonstrations that infringe upon the 
rights of others to engage in and listen to expressive activity.”98 
In March 2018, Louisiana introduced a similar bill 
prohibiting “protests and demonstrations that infringe upon the 
constitutional rights of others” by substantially and materially 
disrupting someone else’s expressive activity.99  In June 2018, the 
bill was signed into law.100 
 
93 Campus Free Speech Act, H.B. 2939, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 
2017). 
94 2017 Cal. ACA-14, Reg. Sess., (Cal. 2017). 
95 Id. 
96 S.B. 350, 99th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess., (Mich. 2017). 
97 H.B. 527, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2017). 
98 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-300 (2018).  
99 S.B. 364, 2018 La. Leg. Reg. Sess. (La. 2018). 
100 Id. 
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C. Costly Fallout: Summer, 2017–Present 
To date, twenty-four states have either introduced or passed 
legislation seeking to protect free speech and expression on 
public college campuses.101 
Although it is unclear whether this legislation and proposed 
new legislation will be effective, in the months following the 
adoption of many of these bills, universities reluctantly opened 
their doors to controversial speakers, often in the face of threats 
of litigation.102  These decisions have had violent and costly 
consequences. 
Prior to the deadly attack at the white nationalist event in 
Charlottesville, marchers sought permits from the city to gather 
in Emancipation Park, adjacent to the University of Virginia 
campus.103  The city initially granted the permits, but as the 
event drew more attention, the Charlottesville city manager 
attempted to revoke the permits to move the event to a larger 
park, about a mile from the originally intended location.104  The 
city immediately met backlash from the American Civil Liberties 
Union (“ACLU”).105 
On August 8, 2017, the ACLU and Rutherford Institute 
issued a letter, challenging the constitutional basis of the city’s 
attempt to move the event, and threatening litigation should the 
city succeed.106  Following litigation, the city allowed the event to 
continue in its originally intended location, and onto the 
University of Virginia campus.107  The University of Florida faced 
a similar dilemma when white nationalist Richard Spencer 
 
101 Nikita Vladimirov, MAP: 24 States Have Now Proposed Campus Free Speech 
Bills, CAMPUSREFORM (Mar. 19, 2018), https://campusreform.org/?ID=10656. 
102 See, e.g., Anemona Hartocollis, University of Florida Braces for Richard 
Spencer, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/us/florida-
richard-spencer.html (reporting that the University of Florida initially denied 
Richard Spencer’s request to speak, only permitting the event after Spencer 
threatened legal action). 
103 Wamsley, supra note 3; Matt Talhelm, ACLU, Rutherford Institute Urge 
Charlottesville to Allow Rally at Emancipation Park, NBC29 (Aug. 8, 2017, 5:14 
PM), http://www.nbc29.com/story/36089526/unite-the-rally-coverage-8-08-2017. 
104 Wamsley, supra note 3. 
105 Talhelm, supra note 103. 
106 Id. 
107 Wamsley, supra note 3; Hawes Spencer & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, White 
Nationalists March on University of Virginia, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/11/us/white-nationalists-rally-charlottesville-
virgina.html. 
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rented space on campus to speak.108  When the university denied 
his request, Spencer’s organization threatened legal action.109  
The university allowed him to speak, but the university president 
released a message renouncing Spencer’s views, and urging 
students to stay away from the event.110 
During the event, protestors chanted over Spencer.  Spencer 
fielded questions from the audience, and protestors responded to 
his answers with booing and holding up fists as a symbol of black 
power.111  Less than two hours after the event, and about a mile 
away, three shooters chanting “Hail Hitler!” delivered “Nazi 
salutes and fired a gun at a group of protesters.”112  The three 
men, two of whom had connections to white supremacist groups, 
were charged with attempted homicide.113 
Protection of hate speech on campus comes at a cost—a cost 
that universities alone must bear.  Despite the violence and 
discord in Charlottesville, universities continue to host 
controversial speakers, but must brace themselves for the violent 
consequences.114 
1. Tangible Cost 
When universities choose to host controversial speakers, 
they often bear a significant financial burden for preventative 
safety measures.115  For these events, universities typically need  
 
 
 
108 Lois Beckett, White Supremacist Richard Spencer Faces Barrage of Protest at 
Florida Speech, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2017/oct/19/richard-spencer-protest-university-florida-speech-white-supremacist. 
109 Sarah Larimer, University of Florida Denies White Nationalist Event 
Request, Citing Safety Concerns, WASH. POST (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.wash 
ingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/08/16/university-of-florida-denies-white-
nationalist-event-request-citing-serious-concerns-for-safety/?utm_term=.e1798e1c 
0f56. 
110 Hartocollis, supra note 102. 
111 Matt Pearce & Les Neuhaus, White Nationalist Richard Spencer to Noisy 
Florida Protesters: You Didn’t Shut Me Down, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2017), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-florida-spencer-speech-20171019-story.html. 
112 Lois Beckett, Three Men Charged After Protesters Shot at Following Richard 
Spencer Speech, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2017/oct/20/gainesville-shooting-three-men-charged-florida-richard-spencer. 
113 Id. 
114 Mark G. Yudof & Kenneth Waltzer, Free Speech, Campus Safety, or Both, 
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Free-
Speech-Campus-Safety-or/241220. 
115 See id. (reporting that Ben Shapiro’s speech at UC Berkeley cost the 
University over $600,000 in safety measures). 
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to draw on university security resources and work with local law 
enforcement to gather hundreds of security officers to control the 
violent response.116 
The University of California, Berkeley, has hosted and 
attempted to host controversial speakers including Ann Coulter, 
Milo Yiannopoulos, and Breitbart News editor Ben Shapiro.117  
Even after Ann Coulter’s speaking engagement was cancelled,118 
the University still paid approximately $665,000 in security costs 
due to resulting protests.119  Berkeley estimates that it paid 
approximately $2 million in protest management costs in 2017.120  
In October 2017, when the University of Florida hosted Richard 
Spencer, the event cost the university about $600,000.121  Despite 
the money expended, the university was not able to prevent 
violent repercussions.122  Whether the speakers, the protestors, or 
the counter-protestors are truly the cause of anticipated violence, 
the responsibility for the cost typically falls on the university. 
Although the Supreme Court has recognized that 
universities should have autonomy over their budgets, and have 
a right “to make academic judgments as to how best to allocate 
scarce resources,”123 when faced with First Amendment 
challenges, universities’ autonomy is reduced. 
2. Intangible Costs: Disruption and Harassment 
University administrators have observed that the broader 
purpose of educational institutions is better served when 
universities host more discussions and more speech rather than 
less.124  Yet, legal scholars have also pointed out the destructive 
 
116 See Suhauna Hussain, The Costs of the Campus Speech Wars Are Piling Up 
for the Police, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (July 3, 2017), https://www.chronicle.com/ 
article/Free-Speech-Campus-Safety-or/241220. 
117 Id.; Jennifer Calfas, How Much White Nationalist Richard Spencer Is Costing 
the University of Florida, TIME (Oct. 18, 2017), http://time.com/money/4987460/how-
much-white-nationalist-richard-spencer-is-costing-the-university-of-florida/. 
118 Hussain, supra note 116. 
119 Id. 
120 Calfas, supra note 117. 
121 Beckett, supra note 108. 
122 See supra Part II.C. 
123 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981). 
124 Pub. Affairs, U.C. Berkeley, Chancellor Christ: Free Speech Is Who We Are, 
BERKELEY NEWS (Aug. 23, 2017), http://news.berkeley.edu/2017/08/23/chancellor-
christ-free-speech-is-who-we-are/. 
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effect certain speech can have on students.125  The events in 
Charlottesville, particularly the presence of armed protestors on 
campus, using violent epithets and invoking Nazism have proven 
distracting and disturbing for students.126  Scholars have also 
pointed out the particular impact that these events may have on 
racially diverse students—both exaggerated immediate impact, 
and latent psychological impact.  Psychological studies have 
documented a positive correlation between racial trauma and 
both mental and physical health problems.127  Psychologists 
recognize that the events in Charlottesville could amount to 
racial trauma both at the university and beyond.128  Scholars 
further predict that racial harassment, “[i]f unaddressed . . . can 
negatively impact college safety, pedagogy, and class 
attendance.”129 
Notwithstanding the trauma that students can experience as 
a result of violent, intimidating, and threatening speech, speech 
that does not directly advocate violent conduct does not lose First 
Amendment protection.130 
III. A NEW APPROACH TO CAMPUS FREE SPEECH CODES 
Universities often falter when balancing their role as 
educational institutions with their duty to protect students when 
controversial speakers use these institutions as platforms.  When 
students call for speakers to be prohibited from campuses, and 
 
125 See, e.g., Tsesis, supra note 36, at 621–24; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response 
to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2332–38, 
2370–73 (1989). 
126 See What U.Va. Students Saw, supra note 2 (statement of Nojan Rostami) 
(describing trauma associated with the possibility that “armed militiamen” who 
“beat and pepper-sprayed” his friends and murdered a young woman were allowed 
free access to his home). 
127 Jason Silverstein, How Racism Is Bad for Our Bodies, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 
12, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/03/how-racism-is-bad-
for-our-bodies/273911/. Psychologists forecast that the events at UVA may have a 
similar traumatic impact, but because of the latent nature of the injury, it is difficult 
to document the results immediately. Steve Fund Podcast #3 The Psychological 
Impact of Charlottesville, (Aug. 25, 2017) http://www.stevefund.org/psychological-
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128 Steve Fund Podcast #3: The Psychological Impact of Charlottesville, supra 
note 127. 
129 Alexander Tsesis, Campus Speech and Harassment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1863, 
1877 (2017). 
130 See Padgett v. Auburn Univ., No. 3:17-CV-231-WKW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
74076, at *2 (M.D. Ala. 2017). 
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state legislatures seek to impose stronger free speech protections, 
administrators’ dilemmas become more complicated. 
This Part draws on legislation that several states have 
proposed to draft a model campus speech code that better 
balances universities’ dual roles, while not running afoul of the 
First Amendment.  State legislatures, in attempting to resolve 
the dilemma that universities face, often only focus on a 
university’s role as a state actor, and lose sight of its custodial 
responsibilities.  Because of this bias, these bills cannot 
adequately resolve the problem.  Therefore, this Part 
recommends that state legislatures encourage but do not impose 
campus free speech policies for universities to adopt. This Part 
proposes viewpoint-neutral preventative policies that ensure free 
expression while controlling the damaging effects of harassment 
and intimidation.  This Part also recommends policies that state 
legislatures ought not recommend, such as those which impose 
mandatory punishment for infringing on free speech rights of 
students, or limit universities’ ability to adopt reasonable time, 
place, and manner restrictions, including imposing restrictions 
on free speech zone policies. 
A. What Campus Policies Should Do 
1. States Should Encourage Universities to Impose Viewpoint-
Neutral Safety Measures 
States should encourage universities to establish time, place, 
and manner safety restrictions, which ensure student safety but 
do not restrain speech.  One such measure is disallowing 
weapons at campus events and protests.  This can ensure student 
safety by limiting the potential for and extent of violence on 
university campuses.131  Disallowing weapons also safeguards 
protected expression because, although viewpoint-neutral, the 
measure decreases the likelihood that otherwise protected speech 
will veer into categories of unprotected speech, such as speech 
intending to intimidate, fighting words, and true threats. 
Another measure that states should encourage is restricting 
attendance at speech events to students, faculty, and alumni.  In 
Charlottesville, and at the University of Florida, acts of violence 
were committed by non-university community members.132  At 
 
131 Yudof & Waltzer, supra note 114. 
132 Bromwich & Blinder, supra note 44; Beckett, supra note 112. 
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U.C. Berkeley, leading up to Ann Coulter and Milo Yiannopulos’ 
speaking engagements, commentators noted that students 
largely supported Coulter’s right to speak, and engaged in 
peaceful protests, while non-community members were 
responsible for rioting.133  Limiting audience membership to 
community members is a viewpoint-neutral measure that 
universities could use to curtail violent repercussions of protests, 
and limit costs of these events. 
Further, universities could limit speakers to those who have 
actually been invited by community members to speak on 
campus.  Richard Spencer was never invited to speak at either 
the University of Florida or Auburn University; he rented the 
space unilaterally.  The university was not under an obligation to 
host him, unless its policy was to allow any speaker to rent space 
on their campus to host speaking events.  A viewpoint-neutral 
policy requiring that outside speakers be invited by students or 
faculty is constitutionally permissible.  Requiring that students 
or faculty invite outside speakers would likely limit the ability of 
outside groups to target university campuses to spread violent 
messages. 
2. States Should Encourage Universities to Adopt Viewpoint-
Neutral Cost Policies 
Time, place, and manner restrictions of this type can be 
costly to enforce.  For example, to disallow weapons, a university 
would likely require searches, or require that protestors pass 
through metal detectors, all at a significant cost to the 
university.  The University of Florida president noted that even 
though Spencer was not invited to speak on campus, but 
arranged the event himself, the university was not permitted to 
pass the cost of keeping the event safe on to Spencer.134  States 
should work with universities to provide strategies that 
universities can use if they face situations such as these, or if the 
cost of keeping an event safe becomes prohibitive.  These 
strategies should include allowing and facilitating transfers to 
locations that can accommodate larger crowds, costs, and risk of 
violence.  When protests or events become cost-prohibitive, 
universities should be able to exercise other options for allowing 
the speech as valid time, place, or manner regulations. 
 
133 McLaughlin, supra note 45. 
134 Hartocollis, supra note 102. 
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3. States Should Encourage Universities to Use Anti-
Harassment Policies to Mitigate Intimidating or Threatening 
Expression 
a. Viewpoint-Neutral Anti-Harassment Measures 
Anti-harassment policies can solve the problem of 
threatening speech, and can provide recourse for students who 
suffer one-on-one verbal attacks.  Virginia v. Black may provide a 
framework for expanding campus policies that target harassment 
and intimidating speech.135 
The plurality in Black allowed regulation of symbols that 
invoke a long and pernicious history as signals of impending 
violence.  Indeed, under Black, universities may be empowered to 
permissibly ban protestors like those in Charlottesville, who were 
armed, wearing Nazi regalia, and marching through residential 
university campuses.  Like Black, the symbols the offenders in 
Charlottesville invoked have a uniquely violent history.  When 
protestors target campuses in huge groups, when they wield 
weapons, and when they invoke a history of genocide to support 
their message, their speech should fall within the “intent to 
intimidate” category, the proscription of which Black allows.136 
While such policies would address the most extreme 
examples of intimidation on campus, most merely controversial 
speech would likely not reach Black’s threshold.  For speech that 
does not reach this threshold, universities should still be 
empowered to limit one-on-one incendiary speech, inciting 
speech, and violent expressive behavior—all of which the 
Supreme Court has carved out as unprotected. 
b. Viewpoint-Specific Anti-Harassment Policies 
When adopting policies, states should be conscious of the 
outer limits of free speech protections that the Supreme Court 
has recognized.  In R.A.V., the Court noted that viewpoint-based 
restrictions are permissible, and even mandatory, when the 
constitutional rights of the speaker clash with the constitutional 
rights of the listener.  The Court noted that viewpoint-based 
restrictions are appropriate if, for example, an employer seeks to 
limit sexually derogatory “fighting words,” the utterance of which 
would violate Title VII’s prohibition against sexual 
 
135 See supra Part I.A.2; Tsesis, supra note 36 at 653–54. 
136 See supra Part I.A.2 and accompanying notes. 
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discrimination in the workplace.137  Title VI prohibits public 
universities, as institutions that receive federal funding, from 
providing a hostile environment on the basis of race or sex.138  For 
a student to raise a claim under Title VI, he or she must show 
the alleged harassment is so severe and pervasive that it 
deprives the victim of access to educational benefits.139  Although 
this is a high standard, in light of the rise in bias and hate 
incidents, and the particularized targeting of university 
campuses,140 the impact of these events could rise to that level. 
B. What Campus Speech Policies Should Not Do 
1. States Should Not Impose Overbroad Punishments for 
Infringing on Speech Rights 
A common regulation in the bills that Illinois, Louisiana, and 
California proposed, and in the bill that North Carolina passed, 
is a mandatory punishment for demonstrators who infringe on 
the expressive rights of others.  This policy is problematic, as it 
seeks to solve the problem of restricted free speech by silencing 
the dissent. 
The incident at DePaul can be instructive in determining the 
extent to which protestors may disrupt controversial speakers.  
At DePaul, the dissenting students chanted, making the 
controversial speaker inaudible.  Silencing dissenters for 
disruptive speech is likely unconstitutional.  Dissenters’ political 
speech is likewise protected, and silencing such speech would, in 
effect, prioritize the First Amendment right of the primary 
speaker.  Universities should be free to cordon protests, and 
advise students against disruption.  But punishing students for 
engaging in peaceful disruption goes too far, and infringes on the 
rights of the demonstrators. 
One disruptive student at DePaul used a whistle to drown 
out the sound of the controversial speaker.  This strategy too, is 
likely unconstitutional, as it amounts to a non-speech act, which 
is not afforded First Amendment protection.141  In R.A.V., the 
Court likened unprotected speech to a “noisy sound truck,” 
 
137 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 389–90 (1992). 
138 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964); see also Qualls v. Cunningham, 183 F. App’x 564, 
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because such behavior does not advance a viewpoint, and its non-
speech aspects are the grounds for limiting it.142  Non-speech acts 
used to silence speakers go beyond peaceful political dissent, and 
may be permissibly prohibited. 
Protecting the free speech rights of controversial speakers 
should not come at the expense of dissenters’ free speech rights.  
States should refrain from imposing this expense. 
2. States Should not Prevent Universities from Effecting Time, 
Place, or Manner Restrictions 
States should not limit universities’ ability to enact 
reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions justified by 
protection of public safety.  Universities should have autonomy in 
making decisions for student safety because universities are 
charged with the responsibility to keep students safe.  Time, 
place, and manner regulations are by definition viewpoint-
neutral, and ensure that universities can exercise their 
responsibility for students without interfering with free speech 
rights. 
When states seek to define the open spaces of campus as 
traditional public fora, they limit universities’ ability to impose 
time, place, and manner regulations, and they necessarily make 
residential university campuses less secure.  These policies limit 
universities’ ability to control who may demonstrate on their 
campuses; any such restriction is presumptively invalid under 
this type of policy. 
Universities, with respect to time, place, and manner 
regulations, should be held to the federal constitutional standard, 
and universities should be free to designate parts of their campus 
limited public fora at their discretion.  This standard provides 
sufficient protection to free speech, but allows universities 
autonomy in preventing violence.  This is important in the case of 
campus speakers because the broad range of potential risks that 
controversial speakers may pose.  For example, a university 
should react differently to a white supremacist march through 
campus than to a conservative speaking event.  Allowing 
universities more autonomy allows them to exercise discretion, 
and therefore better protect students’ physical safety.  Valid 
time, place, and manner restrictions are tools that should be 
available to universities in exercising this discretion. 
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It could be argued that universities should be considered 
public fora because, for students, their campuses function as a 
microcosm of society, and should therefore be treated no 
differently from real society.  Furthermore, some university 
campuses contain landmarks and parks that fit within the 
definition of a traditional public forum.143  But this argument 
fails because of the heightened custodial and legal duties that 
universities owe to their students.144  In bearing a duty to protect 
students, universities should not be unreasonably limited in the 
means by which they protect students, and exercise this duty.  
This illuminates the conflict between the dual roles of 
universities: one as educator—responsible for creating a space 
where students can and will confront challenging ideas; and one 
as guardian—responsible for students’ safety and protection.  
Universities should have discretion in striking this careful 
balance, circumscribed by the protections that the First 
Amendment affords. 
CONCLUSION 
The line between protection of free speech and protection of 
student safety is difficult for universities to tread.  Universities 
should not be restricted in protecting the physical safety of 
students merely because acts of hate are being wrapped in 
banners of free speech.  Nor should universities exercise 
unfettered control over the messages allowed to be disseminated 
on their campuses.  The problems of hostile crowds and 
controversial speakers cannot be solved by only focusing on 
protecting free speech; to do so only accounts for half of the 
problem.  The approach this Note proposes takes into account 
both sides of the careful balance that universities must strike.  
This Note proposes providing universities with guidelines and 
autonomy, in order to empower institutions to protect student 
safety, without engaging in censorship. 
 
143 Holly Epstein, Do Controversial Figures Have a Right to Speak at Public 
Universities?, USA TODAY (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/college/ 
2017/04/20/do-controversial-figures-have-a-right-to-speak-at-public-universities/ 
37431059/. 
144 See, e.g., Nero v. Kan. State Univ., 861 P.2d 768, 773, 779 (Kan. 1993) 
(recognizing that although whether a special relation imposing tort duty exists is a 
matter of law, such a relation between student and university existed). 
